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Discussions about dignity continue unabated. For some authors, the ambiguity of 
dignity is part of the strength of this ethical concept. Glenn Hughes suggests that 
an “intrinsically heuristic concept means that [the concept] refers to an intelligible 
reality of which we have some understanding, but whose full or complete content 
remains, and will always remain to some degree, unknown to us.” 1 Dignity is a 
heuristic concept that can never be fully known, in part because the human person 
is ultimately a mystery.
Because we have some understanding of who we are individually and as human 
beings, the concept of human dignity is not without content. But just as we never 
fully understand ourselves or other human beings, we also never fully understand 
human dignity.
This line of thinking can be theologically developed. If we are made in God’s 
image and likeness, then we must always remain at least somewhat unable to be fully 
comprehended. In the Summa contra gentiles and elsewhere, St. Thomas Aquinas 
taught that God cannot be fully comprehended. In this life, we cannot fully compre-
hend God because our understanding of who God is comes from the effects that God 
brings into being. These effects allow us to partially but never fully understand the 
First Cause. But even in the life to come, the blessed in heaven do not fully compre-
hend God, because only an infinite Intellect can comprehend the Infinite Being of 
God. Even in heaven, only a Divine Mind can understand perfectly the Divine Being. 
Of course, it does not follow from this that the blessed in heaven or the faithful on 
earth can know nothing about God. However, the practice of apophatic or negative 
theology reminds us of the fragility of our knowledge of God. 
 1 Glenn Hughes, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,” Journal of Religious Ethics 39.1 (March 2011): 8.
PhilosoPhy and Theology
The NaTioNal CaTholiC BioeThiCs QuarTerly  WiNTer 2015
770
If our knowledge of God is incomplete, fragile, and subject to development, then 
so too our knowledge of the human person made in God’s image must be incomplete, 
fragile, and subject to development. Human dignity necessarily involves the human 
person, so our understanding of human dignity as well never reaches perfection. 
In his article “Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically 
Heuristic?,” Bharat Ranganathan argues that this ambiguity causes serious problems 
for dignity as a bulwark for human rights.2 To the degree that a particular theologi-
cal or metaphysical basis is given for human dignity, consensus for human dignity 
and therefore human rights is eroded. Moreover, if we cannot disambiguate human 
dignity, then we cannot use it to disambiguate various possible human rights.
Ranganathan concerns are well placed. It may be that speaking about the theo-
logical basis for dignity undermines the usefulness of the concept when addressing 
particular audiences. A pluralistic, secular audience will be left unpersuaded by a 
grounding of dignity in any particular theological or metaphysical framework. This 
weakness, though, is shared by all particular outlooks and conceptions. A utilitarian 
approach leaves the Kantian cold, and the Kantian approach provokes Aristotelian 
rejection. The fact that a particular theological or metaphysical basis for dignity is 
not shared by everyone counts against it as much as against any other justification 
that is also not shared by everyone. Nevertheless, it is wise to consider the audience 
to which one is speaking. As Aquinas notes in the Summa contra gentiles, when 
arguing with Christians, appeal can be made to the New Testament. In arguing with 
Jewish believers, appeal can be made to the Hebrew Scriptures. In arguing with 
non-believers, appeal can be made only to reason. 
Ranganathan is ultimately right that dignity cannot serve as useful in con-
temporary debate unless it is disambiguated. Fortunately, this work of clarifying 
various senses of the term has been carefully done by Daniel Sulmasy. In his article 
“The Varieties of Human Dignity: A Logical and Conceptual Analysis,” Sulmasy 
distinguishes three senses of dignity—intrinsic, attributed, and inflorescent. 3 Once he 
clarifies the distinctions between these senses of the term and establishes the proper 
logical relationship among them, Sulmasy shows that “dignity” is not hopelessly 
ambiguous and therefore is not useless in bioethical debates. 
To say someone has intrinsic dignity is to claim that the person has worth, 
value, and stature simply in virtue of being human. This dignity cannot be lost but 
rather remains as long as the human being remains. Just as every single living human 
being has the biological quality of being a mammal, so too every single living human 
being has the ethical quality of intrinsic dignity. Intrinsic dignity does not rely on 
the choices of anyone, but is something that remains whether or not someone is 
recognized to have it.
 2 Bharat Ranganathan, “Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically 
Heuristic?,” Journal of Religious Ethics 42.4 (2014): 770–775.
 3 Daniel Sulmasy, “The Varieties of Human Dignity: A Logical and Conceptual 
An alysis,” Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 16.4 (2013): 937–944.
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Attributed dignity is something that human beings confer on one another by 
choice. If Princeton grants an honorary doctorate to a benefactor, the university 
enhances the attributed dignity of the benefactor. On the other hand, a jailer might 
undermine the attributed dignity of his captives by feeding them only dog food or 
forcing them to parade around naked. 
Finally, what Sulmasy calls inflorescent dignity consists in the well-being and 
flourishing of the person in question. When human beings live lives in which they 
are accorded respect and enjoy good health, warm friendships, and the deepening of 
knowledge, they enjoy inflorescent dignity. Dignity as flourishing depends in part on 
choice but also in part on circumstances beyond the power of human choice. 
None of these three uses of the word “dignity” is the correct usage, but each 
sense of the term may be properly used in different contexts and for different pur-
poses. Yet the various senses of the term “dignity” on Sulmasy’s view are logically 
and linguistically related, with the intrinsic sense being the prior sense of the term.
Sulmasy’s thesis is that attributed and inflorescent dignity presupposes both 
logically and linguistically the intrinsic sense of dignity. His disambiguation of the 
term “dignity” is valuable, but the argument he gives for the thesis is overly complex, 
consisting of nine numbered considerations and many subdivisions. 
If I have understood his arguments correctly, they might be briefly summarized 
in the following way. Attributed dignity presupposes intrinsic dignity because we only 
attribute dignity to beings that we have already picked out as having intrinsic value. 
Inflorescent dignity presupposes intrinsic dignity because if the being in question 
is ultimately unimportant (lacking intrinsic dignity), then its flourishing is likewise 
ultimately unimportant. 
If this construal of Sulmasy’s argument is correct, then I do not think it is 
a sound argument. Attributed dignity may be conferred (as by the granting of an 
honorary degree) on someone who is not recognized as having intrinsic dignity. 
Consider, for example, a racist provost who wants to shore up his image as being 
against racism, so he gives an honorary doctorate to an African-American profes-
sor at an Ivy League college. The provost might both hold that people of color do 
not have intrinsic value and also authorize the conferral of this attributed dignity to 
the professor. Consider too any philosopher who denies that any human being has 
intrinsic dignity, but who thinks that dignity only arises at some point in human 
development, such as at viability, sentience, or birth. That philosopher also is 
perfectly capable of performing acts which bestow attributed dignity on others. 
Similar examples could be provided to indicate that inflorescent dignity also does 
not depend upon intrinsic dignity. 
I wish Sulmasy had spent greater time in this article, perhaps he does in other 
writings, explaining the justification for intrinsic dignity. He holds that intrinsic 
dignity arises because of the law-like generalizations, typical features, and natural 
history of natural kinds, but it is not entirely clear to me how these considerations 
establish the conclusion that all human beings have intrinsic dignity. Sulmasy writes, 
“There might be those who would claim that only a morally indefensible speciesist 
bias could lead one to make distinctions in value among living things based on the 
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observation of a gradation in the intrinsic value of biological natural kinds by virtue 
of increasing phylogenetic complexity.” 4
Can there be gradations among things with intrinsic value? Sulmasy appears to 
have in mind the idea that human beings have intrinsic value but that, say, cats also 
have intrinsic value but less intrinsic value than humans. For this reason, it is wrong 
to kill a cat without justification and it is wrong to kill a woman without justification, 
but it is much worse to kill a woman than a cat. 
By contrast, Sherif Girgis argues that “person” in the moral sense cannot be a 
matter of degree, because if you matter not just instrumentally but intrinsically, if your 
well-being counts as an ultimate reason for action, then there cannot really be degrees 
of its counting.5 On this understanding of intrinsic value, intrinsic value provides an 
ultimate reason for action that need not be grounded in any further justification. But 
if we understand intrinsic value in this sense, then it is hard to see how there could 
be gradations in intrinsic value. 
I believe both Sulmasy and Girgis would agree to the following. If something 
has intrinsic value, then to use it simply as a means is to make a moral mistake. It 
is to treat someone who should be respected as an end, having value in himself or 
herself, as if the person were merely a tool with instrumental value. Immanuel Kant’s 
formulation of respecting humanity as end in itself articulates this moral principle: 
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” 
When someone acts in the opposite way, treating things that are mere means as if these 
things were ends in themselves, the mistake is apparent. Imagine someone who set 
up his whole life in order to worship a mallet. Honoring the hammer, celebrating the 
nail driver, and contemplating its fine craftsmanship were the source and summit of 
his life. First thought of the day? Of the hammer. Last thought before bed? Hammer 
time. He sacrifices his own well-being and the well-being of other people all for the 
sake of the hammer. It is no less mad to treat a person—an end in himself—as if he 
or she were a thing. To act in either way is to confuse what is merely a means with 
what is an end. For this reason, both Aquinas and Kant agree that to act immorally 
is always to act irrationally.
Like Sulmasy, Carlo Leget also seeks to disambiguate dignity.6 Leget proposes 
three definitions of dignity: (1) social position, (2) intrinsic quality, and (3) dignity 
as experience—a purely subjective notion which “rests entirely on what individu-
als say they feel.” 7 He then critiques each definition. Much of his analysis is sound. 
For example, Leget correctly notes that the problem with dignity-as-experience is 
that people can have mistaken views of themselves, as when a dangerously thin girl 
 4 Ibid., 943.
 5 Sherif Girgis, “Equality and Moral Worth in Natural Law Ethics and Beyond,” 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 59.2 (2014): 143–162. 
 6 Carlo Leget, “Analyzing Dignity: A Perspective from the Ethics of Care,” Medicine, 
Health Care and Philosophy 16.4 (November 2013): 945–952.
 7 Ibid., 947.
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thinks that she is fat. However, when Leget turns to critiquing intrinsic dignity, his 
analyses are less persuasive.
The problems with intrinsic dignity, in Leget’s view, include the following:
Intrinsic dignity … in Stoic, Christian and Kantian philosophy … was used 
to divide the world into those rational and nonrational beings. Obviously 
this clarity has a price to be paid by both human beings whose rationality is 
compromised and higher mammals who display forms of social and rational 
behavior that we are still trying to understand.8 
These considerations do not in fact undermine the notion of intrinsic dignity. 
If human beings have intrinsic dignity, then human beings who are compromised 
in terms of the exercise of their rationality are not compromised in terms of their 
dignity. An intrinsic quality is a quality that cannot be lost so long as the being in 
question continues to exist. Having sides is intrinsic to being a triangle, so as long 
as a triangle exists, a being with sides exists. Higher mammals, such as dolphins or 
great apes, also do not pose a challenge to the notion of intrinsic dignity. Such beings 
may have intrinsic dignity or such beings may not have it. We can have a fruitful 
argument about such matters. The fact that there are marginal cases in which it is 
unclear whether or not the concept applies does nothing to undermine the concept. 
It is unclear and we may never know whether at this instance we have an odd or an 
even number of hairs on our head, but this fact does not mean that the concepts of 
odd and even numbers are themselves fuzzy. 
Leget continues his critique of intrinsic dignity: 
A second problem, put forward by those who advocate a strong emphasis on 
experienced dignity, is that the idea of intrinsic dignity can work as an intel-
lectual prison that may deny the experiences of people. If I feel that because of 
a fatal disease my dignity as a human person is compromised to such a degree 
that I see the continuation of my life as a hell but I live in a cultural context that 
forbids the termination of my life because of my dignity as a human being, I 
may feel held captive in life against my own will.9 
Advocates of intrinsic dignity can push back on this argument by noting that 
the fact that people have intrinsic dignity does not deny the experiences of people 
who feel they have lost their dignity as experienced. “Dignity” is used in two dif-
ferent senses in such cases, but the senses are related. Because people have intrinsic 
dignity, it matters morally what happens to them. If a person feels degraded because 
of loss of control or other factors that make them feel subhuman, this matters pre-
cisely because they still have intrinsic dignity. If the person really no longer counted 
morally, then we would not concern ourselves with their feelings or their experience 
of losing their sense of dignity. Moreover, some people have accepted the idea of 
intrinsic dignity and have also believed that intentional killing is justified. I am not 
sure these two ideas are ultimately compatible, but the earliest advocates of intrinsic 
dignity, the Stoics, also did not oppose suicide. 
 8 Ibid., 949.
 9 Ibid.
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And yet other authors have pointed to an inconsistency between championing 
autonomy on the one hand and undermining intrinsic dignity on the other. Colin Bird 
points out this connection in the thought of Alan Gewirth: “Every human agent must 
attribute worth to his purposes ... [because he] regards his purposes as good accord-
ing to whatever criteria enter into his purposes.”10 If an agent sees his or her goals 
as worthwhile, implicitly that agent is also affirming some sense of personal worth. 
The agent is the source of the action. If the action is valuable, the agent must also 
be valuable. Gewirth puts the points as follows: “They are his purposes, and they 
are worth attaining because he is worth sustaining and fulfilling, so that he has what 
for him is a justified sense of his own worth.” 11 The conclusion is that the “generic 
purposiveness” of rational action, just as such, “underlies the ascription of inherent 
dignity to all agents” (including oneself).12 If this reasoning is correct, we have new 
support for the thesis of Sulmasy, namely, that intrinsic dignity undergirds other 
senses of dignity. Why should we respect autonomy? The autonomy of a person 
matters only if the person matters. So it is not, in the metaphysical and moral order, 
that autonomy gives rise to the dignity of persons, but rather that the dignity of per-
sons gives rise to the value of autonomy. But this suggests that efforts such as those 
of Mary Ann Warren, Michael Tooley, Alberto Giubilini, and Francesca Minerva to 
ground the value of the human being in the autonomy of the human being are getting 
things backward. 
Leget continues his critique of intrinsic dignity as follows:
A third problem focusing on intrinsic dignity alone is that paradoxically it may 
contribute to cleaning the consciousness of people and abstaining from moral 
action when it is urgent. If the intrinsic dignity of people cannot be taken away 
it may become an excuse for not helping them in need, e.g. when they are 
considered to be far away and not part of our own culture. Whatever famine or 
poverty people may suffer, their dignity can never be taken away from them.13 
This concern, I think, is also not such a problem. Intrinsic dignity cannot be 
lost, which means that whoever has it is the subject of moral rights and deserves 
to be treated in a way that accords with their moral status. But this means that the 
notion of intrinsic dignity is not an invitation to inaction in the moral realm. Rather, 
the intrinsic dignity of each human being provides a reason for action to benefit 
every human being. Suffering and poverty do not take away the intrinsic dignity of 
people, but suffering and poverty invite upright people to care about the poor and 
the suffering and therefore seek to relieve their plight.
chrisTopher KAczor
10 Colin Bird, “Dignity as a Moral Concept,” Social Philosophy and Policy 30.1–2 
(January 2013): 150–176.
11 Alan Gewirth, Self-Fulfillment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2009), 168–169.
12 Ibid., 169.
13 Leget, “Analyzing Dignity,” 949.
